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Does the combination of inflation and high corporate taxes explain the 
increase in bank leverage in the 20th century? Inflation automatically 
increases bank debt, while high corporate taxes hinder capital accumu-
lation. Capital ratios therefore drop, until leverage-induced returns are 
sufficient to uphold them at constant levels. This theory was con-
fronted with Swedish bank data 1870–2001. Bank capital ratios 
dropped when inflation and corporate tax rates were high, during WWI 
and in 1940–1980. The theory can explain the sinking bank capital 
ratios during these periods, but also their relative stability since the 
early 1980s. High corporate taxes and inflation were estimated to 
account for half of the drop in Swedish bank capital ratios since WWII.  
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1  Introduction 
For any country, the leverage of its commercial banking sys-
tem is a point of concern. Because banks are central to the 
financial system and to the whole economy, an inadequately 
capitalised banking sector may become a source of instability 
that could provoke serious financial harm. Low capital levels 
arguably contributed to the severity of the banking crises in 
Asia and Europe in the 1990s. In Sweden, bank capital was 
barely able to sustain the credit losses of the crisis years in 
1991–1993, in such a way that practically the whole commer-
cial banking system was balancing on the verge of bank-
ruptcy. For this reason, substantial effort both in academia 
and in practical policy-making is devoted to devising rules 
and systems that will ensure that capital ratios of banks are 
adequate. A recent example is when major countries en-
dorsed the new Basel Capital Accords (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements 2004).  
In view of this, there are surprisingly few studies on 
what drives long-term changes in bank leverage. Berger et al 
(1995) present data on the capital-asset ratio (CAR) of the US 
banking system in 1840–1990. They find a secular drop 
through the whole period. The drop is particularly sharp 
during the periods 1914–1920 and 1933–1940. The authors 
suggest that these drops may have been due to the introduc-
tion of the Federal Reserve System in 1914, and the invention 
of federal deposit insurance in 1933. Both these inventions 
lowered banks’ need for precautionary capital. Saunders and 
Wilson (1999) compare changes in the CAR of the banking 
systems in Canada, the United States and the United King-




Canadian and British banks between 1900 and 1920 – a pe-
riod of rapid consolidation when the number of banks sub-
stantially decreased. By contrast, the drop in the CAR in the 
US started later, after 1933, and they link this drop to the 
invention of federal deposit insurance. Kroszner (1999) in-
stead suggests that the secular drop in the CAR may be a con-
sequence of increasingly more liquid financial markets, as a 
result of financial innovation.  
In this paper I explore an alternative hypothesis, namely 
whether two fundamentals of post-WWII macropolicy in 
many countries – high corporate taxes and inflation – have 
had the unintended consequence of increasing bank lever-
age. At the end of WWII, Gunnar Myrdal wrote an essay enti-
tled “High Taxes and Low Interest Rates” (Myrdal 1944). 
The subject was postwar policy. In countries like the US, the 
UK and Sweden, interest rates had dropped while corporate 
taxes had been raised to “previously unthinkable” levels in 
the decade preceding and during the war. Although this 
development had been more or less unplanned, the process 
was ultimately driven by the growth of government. Myrdal 
analysed how low interest rates and high taxes depended on 
each other, and argued that both must be maintained after 
the war (along with the wartime regulatory system, such as 
credit regulations and foreign-exchange controls), if the po-
litical demands of the time were to be met. Influential inter-
ests in farming, housing, business and government de-
manded low interest rates. However, the main function of 
the interest rate was to act as a regulator of investment. A 
below-equilibrium interest rate would set in motion a Wick-
sellian cumulative process – therefore, high corporate taxes 




demand. Conversely, high corporate taxes were needed to 
meet political goals of equalising incomes and aid in the ex-
pansion of government. However, to keep after-tax profits at 
acceptable levels to business owners, low interest rates were 
required as compensation.  
  The eight-page essay, published in a Festschrift to Eli F. 
Heckscher on his 65th birthday, was to have a large influence. 
Short, concise, intelligible, it seemed to suggest how all pol-
icy goals could simultaneously be attained. According to 
Krister Wickman, former Governor of the Bank of Sweden, 
Myrdal's analysis became the intellectual basis for Swedish 
monetary policy after the war (Wickman 1958, Jonung 1990). 
This policy was instituted in the so-called Interest Rate Regu-
lation Act (ränteregleringslagen), in 1951.  
However, did the analysis miss something? Could the 
combination of low interest rates and high taxes have unin-
tended consequences on bank leverage? Low interest rates 
normally mean monetary expansion and inflation. Banks are 
special in that inflation automatically tends to swell bank 
deposits and hence bank debt. To be able to keep their capi-
tal ratios constant, banks must actively add to their equity in 
step with inflation. However, high corporate taxes hinder 
capital accumulation. Bank capital ratios will therefore de-
crease. But decreasing capital ratios means increasing lever-
age, which means increasing returns. After a while these 
become sufficient to uphold capital ratios at constant levels.  
As shown in Hortlund (2005), the leverage of the Swed-
ish commercial banking system mainly increased during two 
periods in the 20th century, namely during WWI and in 1940–
1980. Both were periods of inflation and high corporate 




This question is here confronted with Swedish bank data 
1870–2001. Over the period 1882–2001, the combination of 
high corporate taxes and inflation, which is here called ex-
cess inflation, was found to be a statistically significant factor 
for the decrease in the CAR. For smaller sample periods ex-
cluding WWI, the relationship was statistically weaker. With 
regard to economic significance, excess inflation could have 
accounted for half of the postwar drop in Swedish bank capi-
tal ratios, or even more. Since capital ratios were inadequate 
to cope with the Swedish banking crisis in 1991–1993, it may 
be asserted that the postwar macropolicy of inflation and 
high corporate taxes (within a framework of regulations) 
contributed to the severity of the crisis.  
To my knowledge, there is as yet no study that investi-
gates the long-run effects of high corporate taxes and infla-
tion on bank leverage. These two should be of interest as 
potential factors behind decreasing bank capital ratios also in 
countries like the US, the UK and Canada. The period 1895–
1920 was a period of worldwide monetary expansion – in 
particular 1914–1920, when the international gold mecha-
nism became inoperative, and governments made use of the 
printing presses to finance wartime needs. Inflation may 
therefore be an alternative to consolidation in explaining a 
particularly rapid decrease in the CAR during this period. 
Likewise, the year 1933 saw the invention of federal deposit 
insurance in the US, but also the abandonment of the gold 
standard, and governments thereafter engaged in monetary 
expansion – particularly after 1940 when again wartime fi-




2  Leverage, inflation and corporate 
taxes, 1870–2001  
To render credible the idea that inflation and high corporate 
taxes might increase bank leverage, this section presents fig-
ures on bank leverage, corporate tax rates, and inflation, in 
Sweden 1870–2001. Figure 1 shows the capital-asset ratio 
(CAR) of the Swedish commercial banks in 1870–2001.  
 
Figure 1 Capital-asset ratio of the Swedish commercial banks, 
1870–2001.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. Hortlund (2005).  
Data are taken from the Summary of the Bank Reports. The 
calculation of the CAR is explained in Hortlund (2005). In 
1870–1890 the CAR dropped substantially, although there 
was no inflation in this period. The reason was rather a rapid 


















ingly depositing their savings with the banks. From 1895 to 
1910 the CAR increased. The reason was a large entry of new 
banks, and hence the infusion of new equity capital into the 
banking system – new banks start with equity, but have not 
yet acquired debt. The number of banks increased from 45 in 
1895 to 81 in 1909 (Summary of the Bank Reports). Then a 
rapid decline in the CAR followed, particularly during and 
after WWI, 1915–1920. After the war in 1921–1922 there was a 
recession, caused by a contractionary monetary policy. In 
1922 bank profits for the first time turned negative, which 
explains the large drop in the CAR in this year. The CAR was 
then highly stable in the 1920s. The next large drop occurred 
in 1932, the year of the Kreuger crash, and the year after 
Sweden left the gold standard. For the second time bank 
profits turned negative – the CAR again spectacularly 
dropped. For the rest of the 1930s, the CAR was very stable. 
In 1940 a secular decline in the CAR begins, which lasts until 
the beginning of the 1980s. In 1991–1993 Sweden experi-
enced its most severe bank crisis ever. For the third time in 
history, profits turned sharply negative, The CAR dropped in 
1992, but not in 1991 and 1993. After the crisis, the CAR has 
been exceptionally stable.  
  The drops during WWI and in 1940–1980 are of particular 
interest. That these were times of high inflation is shown in 




Figure 2 Annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index, 
1870–2001.  
 
  Mean   S. D.  
1870–1914 0.6  3.4 
1915–1920 19  14 
1924–1939 –0.2  2.2 
1940–1950 4.1  5.0 
1950–1960 4.4  4.4 
1960–1970 4.1  1.7 
1970–1980 9.0  2.4 
1980–1990 8.2  3.0 
1990–2000 3.1  3.6 
1940–1980 5.5  4.2   
Source: Statistics Sweden.   
Before  WWI, average inflation was almost zero, although 
volatility was quite high.1 Then came the high inflation pe-
riod of WWI, with a rate of 19 percent on average in 1915–
1920. This coincides with the large drop in the CAR, which 
decreased from 22 to 15 percent in 1914–1920. In the 1920s 
and 1930s, inflation was again non-existent. From 1940 until 
1990, inflation has been consistently high, at least compared 
to the situation before WWI. Between 1940 and 1970 it was 
about 4 percent (Bretton Woods), and in 1970–1990 it was 
about 8–9 percent. In 1993, it became official monetary policy 
                                                      
1 Price-indices before WWI are not wholly commensurate with those 
of later periods, however. Because they were constructed on the 
basis of a smaller number of goods, they tended to fluctuate more. 














to keep inflation at 2 percent. Since then, inflation has been 
low.  
The periods of falling CAR thus seem to coincide with 
periods of high inflation. It is interesting that Lars-Erik 
Thunholm, one of the most influential Swedish bankers in 
the 20th century, has suggested that inflation was the main 
cause behind the decreasing CAR of the Swedish banks:  
[The 20 percent capital requirement of the Bank 
Law of 1911] has since then repeatedly been 
subject to change, mainly due to a continuous 
inflationary development that has caused bank 
deposits to expand, while it has not been possi-
ble to increase equity at the same rate (Thun-
holm 1962, p. 78).  
The periods of decreasing capital ratios were not only peri-
ods of inflation, but also of high corporate tax rates. This is 




Figure 3 Corporate tax rate in Sweden, 1870–2001.  
 
Sources: 1915–1920: Summary of the Bank Reports (taxes paid). 
1921–2001: calculations by Gunnar Du Rietz (Johansson and Du 
Rietz, 2005).  
Before  WWI, corporate taxes were low. Joint stock corpora-
tions paid income taxes to the local municipalities. They 
were 5 percent on average (Rodriquez 1980, pp. 46–47). Dur-
ing the war, so called “war-boom taxes” were imposed, 
whereby banks paid taxes of about 30 percent. After the war, 
corporate taxes became a permanent feature, although at 
relatively low levels. The tax rate was stable until WWII, 
when taxes were raised to 40 percent. Tax rates were from 
then on high. They exceeded 50 percent most of the time 
after the war, until a tax reform in 1990 lowered them to 30 
percent, and then to 28 percent, which is the current level.  
Did high leverage aggravate the 1990s crisis?  
We saw that postwar capital ratios dropped from levels 















1980s, and that inflation and high corporate taxes potentially 
contributed to this development. One may ask if sinking 
capital ratios was and is a problem. Could not on the con-
trary the development have enhanced economic efficiency, 
since banks may have previously been capitalised in excess 
of modern-day needs? While capital ratios above 10 percent 
were suitable at the turn of the 20th century, perhaps 5 per-
cent is fully adequate at the end of it? However, figures for 
historic credit losses 1870–2001 indicate that postwar capital 
ratios dropped to levels that were too low from a stability 
point of view. Although credit losses in the 1990s crisis were 
not particularly high historically, the low capitalisation made 
them dangerous to the whole banking system. Figure 4 
shows credit losses (including realised losses on sales) as a 
percentage of assets for the Swedish commercial banks in 
1870–2001.  
Figure 4 Credit losses as a percentage of assets for the Swedish 



















Source: Summary of the Bank Reports. Average assets over the 
year.  
As a percentage of assets, losses in “normal” times were 
lower after WWII than they were before WWI. Swedish bank-
ing has suffered three great crises, namely in 1921–1922, 1932 
and 1991–1993. Figure 4 shows that losses as a percentage of 
assets were actually higher in 1922 and 1932 than they were 
in 1992–1993. The losses in the 1990s were not particularly 
high historically – although one could argue that this crisis 
was special in that there were more crisis years (with two 
years when losses were extremely high, compared to one 
year each in the crises of the 1920s and 1930s). However, if 
we look at losses as a percentage of equity, the picture be-
comes different, as Figure 5 shows:  
Figure 5 Credit losses as a percentage of equity for the Swedish 
commercial banks, 1870–2001.  
 


















In “normal” times, credit losses as a percentage of equity 
were slightly higher after WWII than they were prior to WWI. 
Most importantly, the losses during crisis years were much 
higher. These losses were at all time high in 1993 – a stagger-
ing 90 percent of equity. Even if one disregards this “extra-
year”, losses were about 70 percent of equity in 1992, which 
is more than twice the amount of the crises in 1922 and 1932. 
Because of high leverage, the 1990s crisis became the most 
severe in the history of Swedish banking. The aggregate eq-
uity of the whole banking system was in danger of being 
wiped out. The credit losses materialised when the over-
heated economy of the 1980s was radically brought to a halt. 
Factors were: 1) a major change in the tax code, where inter-
est subsidies were slashed from 80 to 30 percent; and 2) a 
change in the goal of monetary policy, from full employment 
to low inflation. Combined, these factors increased real in-
terest rates from negative numbers to positive ones of 5–10 
percent. An additional factor was: 3) the financial turmoil of 
the ERM crisis in the autumn of 1992, during which the Bank 
of Sweden raised its “margin rate” to 500 percent. On the 
roots and consequences of the Swedish banking crisis, see 
Englund (1999).  
3  Other explanations  
This section discusses some alternative explanations to secu-
lar increases in bank leverage. Some of these will be used as 
control variables in the regression analysis below.  
Financial innovation  
A powerful argument holds that bank capital has secularly 




Financial markets are deeper and more diversified today 
than was the case in the 19th century, wherefore banks’ need 
for precautionary capital has decreased. Ögren (2003) studies 
the Swedish commercial banks in 1834–1913, and suggests 
that the note-issuing activity of the Swedish Enskilda banks 
created liquid financial markets which lowered the need for 
precautionary capital. Taking a “functional” approach, Mer-
ton (1995) sees equity as a historically conditioned instru-
ment whose task is to guard against uncertain events. With 
financial innovation, new instruments emerge that offer 
companies better opportunities to hedge against risk, and 
the historic role of equity decreases.  
  Frame and White (2004) argue that despite the fact that 
financial innovation is prominently discussed in the modern 
literature, there is relatively little empirical testing of the 
claims involved. Surveying the empirical literature on finan-
cial innovation, they find only 24 such studies, most of them 
conducted after the year 2000. There seems to be no empiri-
cal studies of the long-term (century-long) role of financial 
innovation on bank performance.  
  In any case, financial innovation seems incapable of ex-
plaining the decreasing capital ratios of the Swedish banks 
after WWII. There was a well-functioning financial market in 
the 1920s and 1930s. At the outbreak of WWII financial mar-
kets virtually stopped working. Heavy regulations and for-
eign-exchange controls were in place 1940–1980. There was 
no money market, and the stock exchange lived a slumber-
ing existence. So called emission controls prohibited firms 
from issuing bonds. Deregulation started in the early 1980s, 
and financial markets revived. New instruments were intro-




port the financial innovation hypothesis. Bank capital ratios 
were stable in the 1920s and 1930s when financial markets 
were active, decreased in 1940–1980 when financial markets 
were shut down, and once again stabilised in the early 1980s 
when financial markets revived. The financial innovation 
hypothesis predicts the opposite: bank capital should have 
decreased in the 1920s and 1930s, stabilised or increased in 
1940–1980, and decreased from 1980 and onwards.  
Market substitution  
A more promising argument is that the revival of financial 
markets in the early 1980s may have stabilised the CAR be-
cause financial markets are a substitute to banks. In the regu-
lated environment of the period 1940–1980, firms and inves-
tors were restricted to banks for funding. With the reactiva-
tion of financial markets, investors could raise capital di-
rectly on the market – this should tend to lower the market 
share of banks and hence their asset volumes, and put up-
ward pressure on the CAR.  
Market discipline  
Market discipline is increasingly emphasised as an impor-
tant mechanism that discourages banks from taking exces-
sive risks. It has recently been incorporated as the “Third 
Pillar” of the new Basel Capital Accord (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements 2004). The deregulated, increasingly com-
petitive environment since the early 1980s could possibly 
have imposed market discipline on the Swedish banks and 
thus stabilised their capital ratios. In a competitive environ-
ment, financial strength becomes a means for banks to attract 
customers. The views of international credit rating agencies 




sation increased in the US in the latter half of the 1990s, be-
yond the capital requirements stipulated by the Basel ac-
cords. They attribute this extra-regulatory capitalisation to 
market discipline: banks with higher default risk need 
higher capital ratios to convince investors. The market disci-
pline argument can potentially explain the 20th century 
movement in the CAR of the Swedish banks.  
Consolidation  
Consolidation may affect leverage in two ways. First, new 
banks start with equity but have not yet acquired debt. A 
time of “de-consolidation” when new banks enter the market 
should therefore see an increase in the aggregate CAR. Sec-
ond, consolidation means that banks may take advantage of 
economies of scale. A larger bank can diversify assets and 
thus decrease overall portfolio risk. These scale effects may 
however rapidly decrease and become negligible beyond a 
certain size. Saunders and Wilson (1999) suggested consoli-
dation as the prime mover behind increasing leverage in the 
Canadian and British banking systems in the early 20th cen-
tury. It could be of importance also in the Swedish case, as 




Figure 6 Number of commercial banks, 1870–2001.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports, Statistics Sweden.  
The number of banks rose in the early 1870s, but was then 
stable in 1876–1896. In the boom period of the late 19th and 
early 20th century, the number of banks grew rapidly. In 11 
years they doubled, peaking in 1908. A time of consolidation 
then started, coinciding with the new Bank Law of 1911 and 
accelerating during WWI. The downward trend bottomed in 
1927. In the 1930s the number of banks was stable. Then in 
1940 a new period of consolidation started that lasted until 
1957. The number of banks then remained stable until 1986, 
when deregulation and a more liberal chartering policy saw 
new banks, domestic and foreign, enter the market. The 
number of banks has increased substantially during the last 
decade and banks are now as many as they were in the 
1890s.  
  Comparing with the UK and Canada, the increase in 















tion in Sweden 1910–1920 also seems to have been more 
rapid – perhaps in part a consequence of the previous bank 
boom.  
Obviously, there appears to be a close connection be-
tween changes in the CAR and the number of banks. Figure 6 
may be compared to Figure 1. The rise in the number of 
banks in the late 1890s coincides with the increase in aggre-
gate CAR. The rapid decrease in aggregate CAR in the period 
1910 to 1925 coincides with the rapid decline in the number 
of banks. Both the CAR and the number of banks are stable in 
the 1930s. The CAR and the number of banks decline slowly 
together 1940–1980.  
Legal restrictions: deposit insurance  
Deposit insurance is widely held to increase bank leverage 
(Berger et al 1995, Saunders & Wilson 1999). Deposit insur-
ance creates moral-hazard incentives for banks to lower their 
capital ratios. The literary prominence of the deposit-
insurance argument is largely due to the American experi-
ence of the 1930s with the founding of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation in 1933. But deposit insurance is 
largely an American phenomenon. Most other countries did 
not have deposit insurance before the 1990s, and hence de-
posit insurance cannot explain sinking post-WWII capital ra-
tios in the world outside the US. This is the case of Sweden, 
where deposit insurance did not exist before 1996.2  
                                                      
2 However, Ljungqvist (1995) argues that an “implicit” insurance 




Capital requirements  
Legal capital requirements entered for the first time with the 
Bank Law of 1911. According to this law, equity had to be at 
least 20 percent of deposits. The capital requirements were 
consistently lowered whenever banks were in trouble of not 
fulfilling them. The 20 percent rule was suspended during 
WWI. From 1921, the equity ratio for large banks was 12.5 
percent – from then on, the capital requirement was lower 
for large banks. In 1923–1925, debenture loans were accepted 
as eligible capital. From 1938, deposits backed by cash (giro 
accounts at the Bank of Sweden) were exempted from capital 
requirements. With the new Bank Law of 1955, “riskless de-
posits” – deposits backed by cash and government and other 
eligible bonds – were exempted from requirements. In 1968 
new principles for calculating capital requirements were 
adopted. From then on, capital would have to be sufficient 
relative to assets, rather than to deposits. Assets were 
weighted by their relative riskiness, where cash and gov-
ernment- and equivalent bonds were perceived as riskless 
and excluded from capital requirements. Capital require-
ments were again modified and lowered in the 1980s, when 
debenture loans were allowed as eligible capital (Wallander 
1994, p. 137).3  
  Since the Bank Supervisory Authority would always be 
willing to modify the rules in times of trouble, capital re-
quirements imposed from 1911 and onwards cannot be said 
to have been binding. Binding capital requirements emerged 
for the first time with the Basel accords in 1988. However, 
                                                      
3 On bank legislation and legal requirements from 1880 and on-




since the capital requirements from 1921 were lower for lar-
ger banks, the legislation may have enforced the movement 
towards consolidation.  
The Bank of Sweden regulations  
The period of decreasing CAR in 1940–1980 occurred in a 
time when financial markets were almost completely regu-
lated. As mentioned in the introduction, Swedish credit 
markets were heavily regulated at the outbreak of WWII. The 
regulations were temporary wartime measures, but were de 
facto continued after the war. They were abolished in the 
1980s. The main instrument of postwar regulations was the 
so-called Interest Rate Regulation Law (ränteregleringslagen), 
which was passed in November 1951. It was an “enabling 
act” that gave the Bank of Sweden the option to control the 
emission of bonds, and to regulate interest rates. Empow-
ered by this act, the Bank of Sweden was able to make “vol-
untary” agreements with the commercial banks (known as 
the “Bank of Sweden regulations”). At monthly meetings, so 
called liquidity ratios were agreed upon, which meant that 
cash plus government- and construction bonds should be a 
certain percent of deposits. The purpose of the liquidity ra-
tios was to facilitate fiscal policy, and to channel credit into 
the public sector and into housing construction. The largest 
banks were required to have a higher liquidity ratio. In Feb-
ruary 1952 the liquidity ratio was set to between 15 to 33 
percent (the latter for the largest banks). The liquidity ratios 
increased by time; in 1959 to an interval of 20 to 40 percent, 
and in 1960 to an interval of 25 to 45 percent. In addition to 
liquidity ratios, the Bank of Sweden controlled the emission 




struction sector were prohibited to issue them. In addition, 
the Bank of Sweden at times imposed lending ceilings to 
control the credit policies of the banks.  
  In the late 1970s the government sector ran large budget 
deficits. It became increasingly difficult to finance these 
through the banking system, wherefore a market for gov-
ernment bonds was created, which revived financial markets 
that had been dormant since the end of WWII (Henrekson 
1995). The government also began to lend abroad, and this 
lending tended to weaken the effectiveness of the foreign-
exchange controls. In addition, there was an international 
trend that favoured deregulation of financial markets. In the 
early 1980s, financial markets in general and the banking 
sector in particular were rapidly deregulated. In September 
1983 the liquidity ratios were abolished. In November 1985 
lending ceilings and bond emission controls were abolished. 
Foreign ownership of banks was allowed, and new banks 
chartered. Finally, in 1989 the foreign exchange controls 
were abolished.    
It is interesting that the regulation period coincides with 
the period of decreasing CAR, from 1940 to the early 1980s. 
This suggests that a regulated environment may have been 
necessary for inflation and high corporate taxes to effectively 
cause changes in bank leverage.  
Risk  
Decreasing risk can potentially explain increasing leverage 
particularly in 1940–1980, when banks were shielded from 
competition and government bonds became their main asset. 
How should historical bank risks be measured? The stan-




their risk-return trade-off, where risk is taken to mean the 
volatility of returns. Volatility is normally measured by the 
standard deviation. Figure 7 shows the standard deviation of 
the profit margin (operating profits divided by assets) for 
ten-year periods (the value for 1980 is thus the standard de-
viation for profit margins in 1970–1979).  
Figure 7 Profit volatility of the Swedish commercial banks, 1870–
2001.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Measured in this way, profit volatility decreased from 1880 
to 1900, but then it started to increase. It increased even more 
during  WWI, and particularly in the crisis year 1922. From 
1942 it decreased rapidly. This pattern is due to the ten-year 
window. The crisis years with large negative returns in 1922 
and 1932 will have large effects on the standard deviation, 
and the effect lasts ten years. In the 1950s and 1960s, profit 
volatility dropped slightly. It then increased in the 1980s, to 














for profit volatility seems to correlate with the pattern for the 
CAR in Figure 1. The variable seems to have explanatory 
power.  
4  Tax-inflation-leverage dynamics 
This section presents a formal model on how inflation and 
high corporate taxes may interact to increase bank leverage. 
Inflation automatically increases bank debt, while high cor-
porate taxes make it hard for banks to increase equity in step 
with inflation. This means that the CAR will drop (i.e., lever-
age increase). However, increasing leverage also means 
higher returns (on equity). After a while they become high 
enough for banks to add to their equity in step with infla-
tion, and thus uphold a constant capital-ratio. Thus, the tax-
inflation logic can explain not only why the CAR began to 
drop in 1940, but also why it stabilised around 1980. The 
logic may be illustrated by a numerical example. Imagine a 
bank with the following balance sheet at the beginning of the 
year.  
    Table 2 A bank balance sheet, beginning of year.  
Assets 1100 Deposits 1000
   Equity  100
 
At the beginning of the year the bank has a debt-equity ratio 
D/E ≡ L equal to 1000/100 = 10, and a capital-asset ratio 
equal to 100/1100 ≈ 9.1 percent. During the year an infla-
tionary development takes place. There is a monetary expan-
sion, and some of the new money is deposited with the bank. 
At the end of the year, deposits have increased by 100 to 




borrows at a (fixed) borrowing rate b = 0.04. In accordance 
with the “leverage formula”, the bank’s return-on-equity 
should increase linearly with the debt-equity ratio according 
to the expression   
L b l l r ⋅ − + = ) ( .              
 (1) 
Calculated with the average debt-equity ratio over the year, 
return-on-equity in our numerical example is equal to 0.05 + 
(0.05–0.04) * 10.5 ≈ 0.16. The banks pay corporate taxes at a 
rate t = 50 percent. The after-tax return is thus 0.50 * 16 per-
cent = 8 percent. In order to keep leverage constant, the bank 
must increase its equity by 10. However, after taxes it has 
only got 8 left to increase equity with. The bank is therefore 
unable to keep its leverage constant out of retained earnings. 
Moreover, it might be the case that stock owners require a 
certain dividend to be paid each year. Assume that they re-
quire an annual dividend d = 0.05. Then only 8–5 = 3 will be 
available for the purpose of increasing equity. At the end of 
the year, the banks balance sheet will then be the following.  
Table 3 A bank balance sheet, end of year.  
Assets 1203 Deposits  1100
 Equity  103
 
The debt-equity ratio has increased from 10 to 1100/103 ≈ 
10.7. Corollary, the capital-asset ratio has decreased from 9.1 
percent to 103/1203 ≈ 8.6 percent. In our numerical example, 
the combination of inflation and high corporate taxes led to a 
development where bank leverage increased. The example 




1. Lending and borrowing rates were exogenously de-
termined 
     in that they were  
  a. not dependent on the rate of inflation; and  
      b. not dependent on the corporate tax rate.  
2. Banks increase equity only through retained earnings 
(and  
     not through new issues of shares).  
Relaxing these assumptions would tend to weaken the link 
between inflation, corporate taxes, and bank leverage.  
An operational model.  
It would be of benefit to present an operational model that 
can be quantitatively tested. The logic is that if leverage is to 
be kept from increasing, after-tax returns must be greater or 
equal to the sum of debt-inflation and required dividends. 
Inflation, it has been said, is always and everywhere a mone-
tary phenomenon. Since newly printed money is normally 
deposited with the banking system, a monetary-driven infla-
tionary process tends to swell bank deposits, and hence in-
crease their debt. Assume that bank debt D increases percen-
tually at the rate of inflation p:  
p D=
•
.              
 (2) 
With regard to dividends, it is of interest to know the mo-
tives behind banks’ dividend policy. 4 Do actual dividends 
paid reflect deliberate risk-return trade-offs, or are they paid 
                                                      
4 A survey of the literature on various motives behind dividend 




because they are a form of “cost of capital” that banks must 
pay in order to stay in business? The latter kind of dividends 
would tend to make leverage more sensitive to changes in 
inflation and corporate taxes. Thus, assume that total divi-
dends d paid may be divided into two parts: one “required” 
part df + ap, and one part dr reflecting risk-return trade-offs. 
The quantity df is the minimum dividend rate that banks must 
pay – dividends actually paid may be larger (which are paid 
according to risk-return trade-offs). df may also be zero. In 
addition to df, bank owners want compensation for inflation 
ap, where p is inflation and a is a number equal to or greater 
than zero. If a = 0 then bank owners only care about nominal 
dividends; if a = 1 then bank owners want a full “real” divi-
dend. Total dividends paid are thus: d = df + ap + dr.  
If banks shall be able to keep leverage constant and at 
the same time pay the cost of capital, then after-tax returns 
must be sufficient to pay both the required dividend and 
add to the capital at the rate of inflation. For leverage not to 
increase, the following condition must hold:  
• • • •
+ + ≥ − ⇒ ≥ ⇔ ≤ D ap d r t D E L f ) 1 ( 0 ,       
 (3) 










.            
 (4) 
pm (p-max) represents the maximum value that inflation is 
allowed to take if leverage is to be held constant. pm is in-
creasing in r [in l, (l–b) and L], and decreasing in t, df and a. 




tual inflation p must be smaller than pm. If p is larger than pm, 
leverage will increase, that is,  
0 > ⇒ >
•
L p p
m .              
 (5) 
Asymmetry 
We saw that if leverage is to be kept from increasing, actual 
inflation p must be smaller than the threshold value pm. One 
may ask: is the relation symmetric? If p is smaller than pm, 
will leverage then decrease? That is, does the following hold:  
?? 0 < ⇒ <
•
L p p
m   
p < pm means that returns are sufficient to pay required divi-
dends and add to equity in step with inflation. Depending 
on their risk-return trade-offs, the banks choose how much 
of after-tax returns to pay in dividends, and how much to 
add to equity. If actual dividends d  paid is equal to the 
minimum df required by owners, that is, if d = df, then lever-
age will decrease in the case of negative excess inflation (p - 
pm). On the other hand, if the whole of after-tax returns is 
paid in dividends, that is, if d = (1–t)r, then leverage will ac-
tually increase (if price-inflation and hence debt-inflation is 
positive). Thus, symmetry does not necessarily apply – it 
depends on the dividend policy of the banks. As long as 
some part of the “extra-returns” are paid as dividends (dr), 
the quantitative effects on leverage from positive and nega-
tive “excess inflation” (p–pm) would be asymmetric: leverage 
would increase relatively more from positive excess inflation 
of a given size, than it would decrease from negative excess 





For given values of l, (l–b), d, a, and t, we may plot pm as a 
function of leverage L. This is done in Figure 8, but with the 






L           
 (6) 
is thus used. Parameter values deemed reasonable from data 
have been chosen. l is assumed to be constant and not af-
fected by inflation. An alternative specification would be to 
assume that inflation is fully reflected in interest rates, such 
that l’ = l + p. It can then be shown that the threshold value 
will be pm’ = (1/t) * pm. Thus, leverage would become less 
sensitive to inflation, and more sensitive to changes in the 
corporate tax rate, but the logic of the theory would not be 
affected. For the regulation period 1940–1983, when interest 
rates were set by the authorities, and “real” interest rates 
were low or negative (Ståhl 1980), it is probably not reason-
able to assume that a change in the inflation rate causes a 
one-for-one change in the interest rate. However, after de-
regulation in 1983 bank rates became more endogenous to 
market forces, and the assumption might be valid. Since in 
the regression analysis below actual returns are used, this 




Figure 8 Tax-inflation-leverage dynamics.  
 
 Note: l = 0.05, g = 0.01, df = 0.04, a = 0, t = 0.05, t' = 0.60.  
The two curves depict the threshold value pm as a function of 
the CAR, for two different tax rates {t,t'}. l and g  are constant 
and thus not sensitive to the tax rate, which means that the 
pm-curve shifts to the left when the corporate tax rate is 
raised. This means that corporate taxes cannot be perfectly 
passed on to lenders and borrowers. For the regulation pe-
riod in 1940–1983, when interest rates were administratively 
determined by the authorities, this is reasonable. Time is 
denoted by the letter s. Points to the left of the pm-curve 
might be stable or not, depending on the dividend policies of 
the banks. We might assume that they are stable. However, 
points to the right of the pm-curve are definitely unstable. For 
a given CAR, if inflation is larger than pm, the CAR will de-
crease. Figure 8 schematically describes the possible post-
WWII interaction between bank leverage, corporate taxes and 
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sented by s0. The corporate tax rate is t. Since s0 is to the left 
of pm(t), the banking system is at rest. At time s1, two things 
happen. First, inflation goes up (from 0.5 to 4 percent). In 
itself, this change would have no effect on the CAR, since the 
banking system would still be at a point to the left of pm(t). 
However, the tax rate has now also increased, from t to t'. 
Thereby the pm-curve shifts to the left. The banking system is 
then at a point to the right of pm(t'). The CAR decreases. 
While the CAR decreases, leverage and hence returns in-
crease. At a certain point, returns are sufficient to uphold a 
stable  CAR. This occurs at point s2. The banking system is 
once more at rest.  
5  Determining required dividends  
The previous section developed a model on how inflation 
and taxes may interact with leverage. In the next section the 
model will be confronted with real-world data. But first, the 
size of the dividend requirement needs to be assessed. The 
parameter values for df and a must be determined. We are 
interested in required dividends in relation to equity. The 
estimation of these is complicated by the existence of hidden 
reserves. Since a substantial part of equity after 1940 was in 
the form of hidden reserves, the question how equity owners 
looked upon these funds becomes important. Therefore, the 
dividend and capitalisation policies of the banks over the 
studied period are briefly reviewed. The section draws on 
talks with Jan Wallander, CEO and board chairman of major 
Swedish banks, 1960–1991.  
During the time of the classical gold standard, things 
were relatively simple. Banks did not systematically increase 




no hidden reserves. Net profits were almost completely paid 
out in dividends – about 7 percent on average in 1870–1914 
(see Figure 9 below). With the advent of inflation and high 
corporate tax rates, banks started to increase their capital 
through retained earnings. This became important from 1940 
and onwards. Up until the 1970s, stock ownership was con-
trolled by a relatively small group of families. With the 
Kreuger crash in fresh memory, and with high income taxes 
on top of the high corporate taxes, they favoured consolida-
tion – particularly in the form of transfers to untaxed re-
serves – over dividends. Stock owners did not much concern 
themselves with dividends in relation to equity, but were 
happy as long as they got a nominal dividend raise. For 
these reasons, banks tried to stow away as much profits as 
possible into hidden reserves, the so called valuation reserve 
accounts. The limit to these operations was set by the tax 
authorities.5 Since, credit losses were small, the capital ratio 
was not of great concern. Although there were formal capital 
requirements, these were in practice not binding, since the 
Bank Supervisory Authority (Bankinspektionen) would al-
ways modify the rules so that the banks would be formally 
able to comply with them.  
At the beginning of the 1980s, the business environment 
changed. Stock ownership became more widespread. The 
foreign-exchange controls became less effective. Banks in-
                                                      
5 High corporate taxes could in this way tend to increase capitalisa-
tion, by a form of “substitution effect”. However, if the reservation 
possibilities set by the tax authorities are restrictive, the “income 
effect” of high corporate tax rates should dominate the substitution 





creasingly raised funds abroad, and the ratings of interna-
tional credit rating agencies became important, wherefore 
capital ratios became a concern. Finally, from 1988, the Basel 
accords put binding capital requirements on the banks.  
  Despite these observations, data suggest that the banks 
followed a policy of paying dividends at a constant ratio to 
their capital. It is “as if” the banks paid a fixed (nominal) 
dividend-equity rate, where equity is book equity plus 70 
percent of untaxed reserves. This is seen in Figure 9.  
 Figure 9 Dividends-to-equity ratio, 1871–1992.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Note: Equity = book equity plus 70 percent of untaxed reserves. 
  
Despite the growth in untaxed reserves, dividends were sta-
ble in the period 1940–1980 at around 4.5 percent of total 
equity in nominal terms. In real terms, dividends decreased 
over the period. From 1980 dividends increased, perhaps 












manded higher compensation for inflation. In view of Figure 
9 it seems reasonable to set the “floor” on dividends at 4 per-
cent. Dividends fell below this floor only in the crisis years in 
the 1920s, 1930s and 1990s. Thus, df is set to 0.04 and a is set 
to 0.  
6  Testing the model  
Excess inflation   
Define the excess inflation x as the actual inflation p minus 
the maximum inflation pm:  
x = p – pm.               
 (7) 
pm is defined by formula (4). Figure 10 depicts excess infla-
tion for the years 1871–2001.  
Figure 10 Excess inflation, 1871–2001.  
 


















There was virtually no excess inflation in 1871–1914, as 
should be expected. But during WWI, excess inflation sky-
rocketed. In the interwar period 1920–1939, excess inflation 
was again negative. In 1940–1980, excess inflation was 1.6 
percent on average. Peaking in 1980, excess inflation was 
brought down in the beginning of the 1980s. From 1983 – the 
year of deregulation, when liquidity ratios were abolished – 
excess inflation was mostly negative, especially in the boom 
years in the latter half of the decade. Excess inflation was 
high in the crisis years in 1932 and in 1991–1993 (but not in 
1922). This is natural: negative profits means that banks are 
unable increase their equity even if inflation is zero. From 
1994, excess inflation has been well below zero – probably a 
reflection of lower corporate taxes and a low-inflation policy.  
  Figure 10 suggests that excess inflation was positive in 
the years when the capital-asset ratio decreased, at least in 
the 20th century. Figure 11 plots dCAR,  the change in the 




  Figure 11 Change in logged CAR, and excess inflation, 1871–2001.  
 
Source: Summary of the Bank Reports.  
Note: Squared dots for the years 1914–1920, round dots for the 
years 1940–1980.  
The tax-inflation-leverage dynamics predicts two things. 
First, when excess inflation is positive, the CAR should de-
crease. This means that points in the right side of the dia-
gram should tend to be centred in the lower square. Indeed, 
this seems to be the case. In particular, the dots of WWI are 
clearly recognisable. Second, if asymmetry is present, then 
when excess inflation is negative, the CAR should not neces-
sarily increase, but rather be stable, or at least increase at a 
low rate. This means that dots in the left side of the diagram 
should be more fairly spread in the upper and lower 
squares. From eye-ball econometrics it is not clear whether 
this is the case. Formal testing is called for.  
Regressions  
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 (9) 
 The variables are the following:  
dCAR: The change in the log of the capital-asset ratio  
X: Excess inflation 
dPROFVOL:  The change in the log of the profit margin  
dNUMBER: The change in the log of the number of banks  
BASEL: A dummy variable for the Basel accord, 1990–
2001  
REGUL: A dummy variable for regulations, 1940–1983 
 The variable X has been defined as in formula (4), with df = 
0.04, and a = 0. dPROFVOL is calculated as in section 3, namely 
as the standard deviation of ten-year returns.6 With regard to 
the Basel dummy, 1990 is chosen as the starting year. Al-
though the agreement was made in 1988, it did not come into 
effect until two years later (Flannery and Rangan 2002). The 
                                                      
6 Regressions were also performed with dPROFVOL calculated on 
the basis of 5 and 15 year returns. The coefficients for these vari-
ables were statistically insignificant. The value and significance of 
the x-coefficient was marginally affected by the choice of time pe-
riod for dPROFVOL. Also, since consolidation should affect the CAR 
over several years, and not only in the year of occurrence, regres-
sions were performed with lagged values of dNUMBER. These lags 
were statistically insignificant, however. Results are available upon 




year 1983 is chosen as the end year for the regulation 
dummy. This was the starting year of the deregulation proc-
ess, when the liquidity ratios were abolished. In addition, 
dummy variables for the crisis years 1922, 1932, 1991–1993 
are used.  
Regressions are performed on differenced variables 
rather than on levels, for three reasons. First, the underlying 
theory expressed in Figure 8 is inherently a theory of differ-
ences: the CAR should decrease if the inflation rate is larger 
than a certain threshold value. Second, the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots reveals that the variables 
CAR, NUMBER and PROFVOL are non-stationary on levels, but 
stationary on differences. Third, the x-variable, the difference 
between the inflation rate and its threshold value, cannot 
easily be expressed in terms of levels. Both autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity can be detected. To grind out these, 
regressions are performed with one lag in the disturbance 
term (by maximum likelihood), and with Huber-White stan-
dard errors.  
Testing for asymmetry 
The tax-inflation-leverage dynamics of Figure 8 suggests that 
the effect of excess inflation on the capital-asset ratio should 
be asymmetric, in that while positive excess inflation should 
mean that the CAR decreases, negative excess inflation 
should not necessarily mean that the CAR increases. Figure 
10 also indicates that this may have been the empirical case. 
Therefore, asymmetry is formally tested. This is done by 
splitting the x-variable into two variables; one that takes the 
value of x for positive x-values and zero otherwise, and one 








> = ≤ =
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X if XNEG and X if X XNEG
X if XPOS and X if X XPOS
   
 (10) 
The variables are then regressed in the same regression. If 
asymmetry is present, then the coefficient for XPOS should be 
statistically significant and negative, while the coefficient for 
XNEG should be neither economically nor statistically signifi-
cant. Moreover, a t-test should reveal that the coefficients are 
not equal.7 Table 4 shows regression results for both the 
unsplitted and splitted specifications of x. The CAR decreased 
mainly during WWI and in 1940–1980. Three sample periods 
are therefore chosen: one “full sample” period 1882–2001, 
one period 1920–2001 that excludes WWI, and a postwar pe-
riod 1940–2001.  That the starting year is 1882 in the full 
sample period is due to the ten-year window for the volatil-
ity variable dPROFVOL.   
                                                      
7 The method has previously been employed for example by Nan-
nestad and Paldam (1997), who use it to test for asymmetries in 




Table 4 Regression results.  
  Dependent variable: dCAR 
  (i)  (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 






   

































































































DW  2.03 2.12 1.99 2.04 2.10 1.94 
Obs.    120 82  62 120 82  62 
Note: Dependent variable: dCAR. Dummies for crisis years 1922, 
1932, 1991–93. Huber-White standard errors. p-values in parenthe-
ses. Bold-italics and bold denote statistical significance on the one-
percent and on the five-percent levels, respectively.  
In the unsplitted regressions (i–iii), the X-coefficient is of the 
expected sign. It is statistically significant at the one-percent 




percent level when regressed on the smaller samples. In the 
splitted regressions (iv–vi), XPOS is of the expected sign. It is 
statistically significant at the one-percent level in the full-
sample regression, but only at the ten-percent level with the 
smaller samples. The coefficient value increases in these re-
gressions, from –0.49 to –0.64 (–0.66). Thus, while statistically 
less significant when the time before and during WWI is ex-
cluded, the economic significance of the variable increased.  
  As predicted, the variable XNEG is close to zero and not 
statistically significant in any regression. The coefficient val-
ues of XPOS and XNEG, and associated p-values, indicate that 
asymmetry might be present. Asymmetry also passes the t-
test at the five-percent level in the full sample regression. 
However, the effect is not strong enough to pass the test in 
the smaller sample regressions.  
With regard to the other variables, the coefficient for 
dPROFVOL is of the expected sign, and statistically significant 
at the one-percent level for the sample 1920–2001, and at the 
five-percent level for the full and postwar samples. That 
dPROFVOL is more significant for the 1920–2001 sample than 
for the full sample is due to the fact that volatility was de-
creasing at the end of the 19th century, when the CAR was 
increasing. This increase should reasonably be due to an in-
crease in the number of banks in this period. However, 
dNUMBER is far from being statistically significant. Contrary 
to the suggestions of Saunders and Wilson (1999), consolida-
tion appears to have performed a limited role in the decrease 
of the CAR of the Swedish commercial banks. With regard to 
the dummy variables, the BASEL-coefficient is of the expected 
sign, and statistically significant at the five-percent level for 




pected sign, but not statistically significant. Neither is the 
constant statistically significant. Its value in regression (i) 
indicates a trend by which the CAR has decreased secularly 
by three percent per year in the period 1882–2001.  
Economic significance  
It could be of interest to try to estimate the economic signifi-
cance of the x-coefficients, particularly for the period since 
WWII. In 1940–1980, the CAR dropped from 13 to 5 percent, 
which is a decrease of about 60 percent. How much of this 
drop may be attributed to excess inflation? The coefficient 
value of the unsplitted X is –0.53 for regression (vi) with 
sample period 1940–2001. In this period, excess inflation was 
1.6 percent on average. Because of excess inflation, the CAR 
should have dropped by 41*1.6*0.45 percent ≈  30 percent. 
Since the CAR actually dropped 60 percent in 1940–1980, 
about half of the postwar drop may be attributed to excess 
inflation. One may also use the coefficients of the splitted 
regression. In 1940–1980 there were 24 years with positive 
excess inflation, which was 4.1 percent on average. Using the 
coefficient for XPOS in regression (vi), the CAR should have 
decreased by 24*4.1*0.66 ≈ 65 percent in 1940–1980. Accord-
ing to this calculus, virtually the entire decrease in the CAR 
after 1940 could be attributed to excess inflation. In sum, 
depending on which regression coefficients are used, excess 
inflation could have decreased the CAR in 1940–1980 with 30 
(60) percent, which is about 50 (100) percent of the actual 
decrease in this period. These numbers could be considered 




7  Conclusions  
The paper explored whether inflation and high corporate 
taxes had the unintended effect of increasing the leverage of 
the Swedish banking system in the 20th century. By a simple 
logic, inflation automatically increases bank debt, while high 
corporate taxes make capital accumulation difficult. Bank 
capital ratios will therefore tend to drop, until leverage-
induced increasing returns become sufficient to uphold them 
at constant levels. This tax-inflation-leverage theory was con-
fronted with Swedish bank data for 1871–2001. The theory 
seems capable of explaining the sinking capital ratios of the 
Swedish banks during WWI and in 1940–1980. The theory 
also seems capable of explaining the relative stability of the 
CAR since the early 1980s. Regression analysis showed excess 
inflation to be a statistically significant variable. However, 
the variable was not as statistically strong in smaller samples 
excluding WWI. Another statistically significant variable was 
changing risk, as measured by the change in profit volatility. 
As predicted by theory, asymmetry between positive and 
negative excess inflation was detected – while positive ex-
cess inflation decreased the capital-asset ratio, negative ex-
cess inflation did not necessarily increase it. With regard to 
economic significance, it was estimated that about half of the 
postwar drop in the CAR of Swedish banks, or even more, 
may be attributed to excess inflation.  
Which way forward? One path would be to improve the 
quantitative analysis. More refined variables for risk and 
consolidation could be employed. In particular, it would be 
interesting to see if bank concentration measured by a con-




in the 20th century. Another venue would be international 
comparisons. Swedish bank leverage increased during peri-
ods roughly similar to those of the US, the UK and Canada. 
Swedish postwar policy was not radically different from that 
of those countries. The world in general experienced the phi-
losophy of state control over the banking system and mone-
tary expansion through the Bretton Woods system. It would 
be of interest to investigate whether the causal agents of this 
study – inflation, corporate taxes and regulations – have ex-
planatory power also for other countries. A third road would 
be to study more closely the impact of deregulation. Excess 
inflation turned negative in the 1990s when inflation was 
brought down from 10 percent to 2 percent, and corporate 
tax rates were slashed from 60 to 30 percent. An additional 
factor may have been the deregulation itself. In a deregu-
lated environment, inflation may be more easily transmitted 
to interest rates, which would raise bank returns and hence 
weaken inflation’s detrimental effect on leverage. How det-
rimental to bank leverage is inflation in a deregulated envi-
ronment?  
The last question should be of relevance to contempo-
rary policy discussions. With the benefit of hindsight, Swed-
ish postwar bank capital ratios dropped to levels that were 
inadequate to sustain the credit losses of the early 1990s, in 
such a way that the whole banking system was balancing on 
the verge of bankruptcy. Leijonhufvud (1981, 2000) has ar-
gued that the costs of inflation has been underestimated in 
economic theory. Overleveraged banks could be an addi-
tional item on the list of unrecognised inflation costs. If the 
calculus is correct that excess inflation accounted for over 




kind could profitably be incorporated into monetary and 
fiscal policy, in order to guard against large-scale, system-
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